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Based on the premise that a functioning state is a necessary pre-requisite 
for pro-poor change, it is critical to investigate the role of the bureaucracy as a 
key catalyst in this process. Weber (1968) ascribes bureaucracies to be anchors 
of the modern nation state as their conduct is based on rational-legal norms. 
Bureaucracies, according to this ideal type, temper the populist urges of 
politicians who wish to execute policy unencumbered by rules and procedures. 
State success or failure in many cases, therefore, can be gauged by the degree to 
which this tension—between the rules based bureaucratic form of administration 
and populist politics—is resolved. Prognosis on pro-poor change in the light of 
the present and anticipated balance between bureaucratic procedures and 
political compulsions is thus an important area of inquiry. 
There is consensus that the disconnect between policy formulation and 
execution in Pakistan has widened considerably in the last three decades or so. 
And this is in spite of the fact of the generally acclaimed view that Pakistan 
inherited a well functioning and competent bureaucracy from the British Raj 
[Braibanti (1966)]. While part of the blame for this disconnect can be ascribed to 
incoherence in policy formulation on the part of the political leadership—both 
civil and military—but bureaucratic malfeasance, incompetence and corruption 
have been critical factors in the level of governance declining over time. 
This paper takes a political economy perspective in analysing the nature 
and causes on the decline in bureaucratic conduct. Section 1 lays out the details of 
this structure. Based on a logical model which places the bureaucracy within the 
larger context of the objective function of the state, the nature of the political 
process, the degree of centralisation and fragmentation of the bureaucratic 
structure and processes for monitoring and accountability of the bureaucracy, this 
model provides the basis for subsequent analysis. Section 2 provides a historical 
overview with regard to changes in the bureaucratic and political structure and the 
impact it had on the above mentioned balance between bureaucratic conduct and 
political compulsions. Section 3 then analyses the consequences on service 
delivery that this systematic weakening of the bureaucratic structure has had. 
Section 4 then critically assesses some of the recent attempts at bureaucratic 
reform in the light of the framework developed in Section 1. The conclusion then 
summarises the paper and draws implications for pro-poor change of the structure 
and conduct of the bureaucratic structure in Pakistan.   
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1.  A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING THE BUREAUCRATIC  
STRUCTURES AND DEVELOPMENT 
In order to understand how bureaucratic structures impact development 
the relationship between politicians, bureaucrats and the public needs to be 
analysed in specific historic contexts [Khan (2002)].  A number of conditions of 
success can be identified by drawing on analytical models that schematically 
describe the relationship between the three protagonists. We draw on the 
framework provided by Khan (2001) in order to provide benchmark conditions 
against which the development of the Pakistani bureaucracy is assessed in 
subsequent sections. 
Khan (2001) argues that the relationships between these three agents 
is interlocked and is briefly summarised in the following schematic diagram. 
As displayed in Figure 1, the electorate or the citizenry is the consumer of 
government services; the politicians or political power-holders translate the 
electorate’s demands into policy; and the bureaucrats are the agents 
responsible for service delivery and regulation. The efficient functioning of 
this system or effective bureaucratic governance depends upon the following 
conditions: 
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(a) Clarity about the Pursuit of Objectives 
Policy objectives of the state are defined by political processes, as well as 
ideologies that permeate state structures at given points in time. Demand 
creation through the political process combined with these ideologies determine 
the remit and functions of the state in specific historical contexts. The range of 
activities that states have pursued have differed both within the same states over 
time and across states. Despite the significant historical variation in objectives 
and ideologies across states that are observed in history the success of states at 
delivering ‘developmental successes’ at a minimum depends upon: (i) the clarity 
about the functions and objectives states have to perform, and (ii) the extent to 
which the chosen functions and objectives correspond to a given set of outcomes 
sought. Clarity about and choice of specific functions and objectives is 
important as it defines the role that that bureaucracy is expected to play and that 
is clearly a starting point of any analysis of civil service development. These 




(b) The Efficacy of the Political Process 
The arrows between the public and the politicians in Figure 1 capture the 
necessity of having efficient political processes that communicate the objectives 
of the electorate to political representatives. The efficacy of this channel 
depends upon how effective these processes are in communicating the real 
interests of the electorate and to what extent is effective demand creation 
controlled by sectional interests or broad-based coalitions. The efficacy of 
demand creation mechanisms is also dependent on the structure of the state: with 
authoritarian regimes by definition being more exclusive in who they respond to 
and being less accountable to the general public. Therefore, the success of this 
process under authoritarian regimes is contingent upon the class or group basis 
of authoritarian regimes, which in turn will be determined by the specific 
historical context. Democratic structures too are not always sufficient to ensure 
the representation of common public interests because they can be captured by 
political clientelist coalitions where politicians deliver privileges to special 
interest groups who control the electoral process both financially and 
organisationally [Khan (2001)]. 
Furthermore, the ‘developmental effectiveness’ of the political process is 
contingent upon how consolidated or fragmented political party collectivities are 
                                                 
1Whether it is a fascist, predatory, developmental, or religiously denominated state does not 
matter. All that matters is that it is a well-functioning state in the sense that the bureaucracy remains 
within the parameters of politically adopted policy guidelines, whatever the set of rules and policies 
that have been prescribed by the political leadership.  
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in particular contexts. Fragmented and unstable political coalitions will result in 
each politicians trying to maximise his short-term payoff even if this comes at 
the expense of long-term social gains [Cheema (2003); Ackerman (1996)]. 
Therefore, the success of this process is contingent upon the extent to which 
democratic regimes are responsive to broad-based coalitions as opposed to 
sectional clientelist interests and the extent to which individual politicians can 
be made to develop long time horizons through cohesive party collectivities. The 
crux of the issue is that political processes and structures should not inhibit the 
functioning of the state and its capacity to deliver services. 
 
(c) Efficient Bureaucratic Monitoring and Accountability 
This condition is extremely important in its own right because even if 
political processes and state ideology result in the selection of ‘pro-poor’ goals 
and policies the transformation of these goals into delivery is clearly contingent 
upon: (i) how effectively politicians or authoritarian managers of the state can 
monitor and sanction bureaucrats, and (ii) the extent to which bureaucratic 
incentives are compatible with the goals established by the political managers of 
the state. Incentive compatibility requires among other things the ‘right’ 
monetary compensation structure. Higher salaries are theoretically expected to 
lower corruption because they increase the opportunity cost of corruption. It is, 
however, well established that this result is contingent upon there being a 
positive probability of a non-performing bureaucrat being detected and 
effectively penalised [Klitgaard (1988)]. It is well-established that high salaries 
as an incentive mechanism, break down if the probability of being caught or 
being effectively sanctioned when caught is very low [Besley and Mclaren 
(1993)]. Again, this means that the ‘developmental success’ of bureaucratic 
service delivery is contingent upon the ease of measuring the performance of 
bureaucrats as well as the cost of sanctioning the non-performance and mala fide 
acts of bureaucrats. 
 
(d) The Degree of Insulation of the Bureaucracy 
Independence or autonomy of the bureaucracy is protected through the 
establishment of well-defined rules, meritocratic recruitment mechanisms 
and non-politicised and predictable long-term career paths. In fact, the 
creation and maintenance of a Weberian bureaucracy is contingent upon the 
extent to which these well-defined rules and procedures can be created and 
the degree to which they insulate the bureaucratic structure from political 
interference [Weber (1968)]. In addition, the existence of a Weberian 
bureaucracy is contingent upon its internal cohesiveness. Internal 
cohesiveness in turn can be achieved through well-defined informal  
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networks within the bureaucracy
2 and/or through a well-defined and 
cohesive cadre system. In short, the degree of insulation of the bureaucracy 
can be judged by the extent to which particular bureaucratic structures can 
be classified as possessing well or weakly defined rules of protection, 
recruitment, promotion and appointments. 
However, the important question with regard to bureaucratic insulation is 
the extent to which insulated/autonomous bureaucracies are ‘necessary’ for the 
creation of a functional state. The judgment on this issue is not straightforward and 
depends upon the type of organisation in both the political sphere and the 
bureaucracy as well as the nature of the interaction between these two spheres. If 
the political process is prone to capture by sectional interests, is clientelist and/or 
its ideology is non-developmental, then well-defined bureaucratic procedures and 
insulated bureaucracies may paradoxically sometimes ensure better delivery of 
services and may emerge as effective checks on clientelist policy choices. 
However, in the opposite case where the political process is compatible with 
‘developmental objectives’ the politicians’ control over the bureaucracy may be an 
important condition for ‘developmental success’ as it allows politicians to hold 
bureaucrats accountable and also to change rules and procedures in order to ensure 
their functionality with the process of development. 
 
(e) The Degree of Bureaucratic Centralisation and Fragmentation 
Theoretically it is now well-established that centralised state structures 
(hierarchical and well-knit structures) are more efficient and less prone to 
corruption than fragmented state structures
3 [Shleifer and Vishny (1993)]. It is 
argued that in fragmented state structures supplying complementary goods 
creates a ‘prisoners dilemma’ like situation as each agency maximises its own 
bribes, while taking the quantity of goods/services supplied by others as a 
given. The outcome is inefficient in the case of a fragmented state as the bribe 
set by each agency is too high and the total amount of goods/services provided 
is too low from society’s viewpoint. A centralised state is more efficient as it 
increases supply, in order to maximise total profits (by internalising the inter-
agency price externality), which in turn makes society better off. However, as 
Khan (2000) and Evans (1989) show, even fragmented states can be efficient 
if agencies coordinate actions in a repeated game. This will happen if the 
following conditions are met: (a) if payoffs from coordination are large 
compared to the payoffs from non-coordination; (b) the time discount of 
officials is sufficiently low; and (c) agencies are not involved in protracted 
                                                 
2For example, because the bureaucrats share the old school tie or are from the same class. 
3Fragmented state structures are defined as structures where independent agencies attempt to 
maximise their individual proceeds from corruption.  
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conflicts over the division of the spoils [Khan (2000)]. However, Ackerman 
(1996) and Cheema (2003) show that the time horizons of bureaucrats or 
agencies is in part a result of the vulnerability of bureaucrats and agency 
heads, which in turn will depend on the degree to which they are susceptible to 
political interference. Excessive political interference will result in reducing 
the time horizons of bureaucrats, which among other things will increase the 
incentives for bureaucrats to defect from collective arrangements and the 
resulting fragmentation of the state structure is expected to reduce efficiency. 
Both the nature of political processes as well as the interaction between 
the politicians and the bureaucracy has undergone change in Pakistan over time. 
This has meant that all the above criteria to analyse and judge bureaucratic 
performance have become relevant in our case. A historical overview will thus 
help in understanding the process and nature of change that the balance between 
political imperatives and rules based bureaucratic conduct has undergone. 
 
2. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF BUREAUCRATIC 
CONDUCT IN PAKISTAN 
Pakistan’s apex bureaucratic structure was inherited from the colonial 
administrative system whose principal purpose was administrative control to 
stabilise and promote the imperatives of colonialism.
4  The cadre-based system 
that Pakistan’s bureaucracy inherited was the legacy of the Indian Civil Service 
(ICS) that stood at the apex of the colonial administrative machinery.
5 Below the 
ICS were provincial-level services, and at the bottom of the hierarchy was the 
subordinate civil service. This structure came to be known as the All India Civil 
Service. Recruits from the ICS served in the central government and on 
important positions in the provinces also. Much of the provincial service cadre 
only served in the province. However, there was some mobility of exceptional 
officers to other provinces or to the centre.
6  
It was not until 1879 that ‘natives’ were inducted into the upper echelons 
of the bureaucratic service.
7 After the formation of the All India Civil Service, 
                                                 
4The principal task for this purpose was to repress indigenous political demands for self-rule 
as well as resource appropriation from the colony. 
5The Indian Civil Service was established as a result of the administrative reforms 
recommended by the Aitcheson Commission in 1887. Prior to the Aitcheson Commission, the 
colonial administrative machinery operated under the East India Company Act, 1793, under which 
‘covenanted’ (employed on individual specific contracts) British officers formed the apex of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy.  [See Kennedy (1987), Chapter 2, for details]. 
6For details of the pre-partition bureaucratic structure in British India, see Kennedy (1987, ch. 2). 
7This was first done under the ‘statutory civil service’ structure, constituted in 1870 (but 
implemented only in 1879) and dissolved in 1887. In this period, one-sixth of the ‘covenanted’ 




almost the entire cadre of the provincial service consisted of Indians. The 
induction of natives in the ICS gradually increased between 1887 and 1947. 
Unlike in the past, Indians were not barred from the ICS formally, but rigid 
recruitment rules based on criteria that were designed exclusively for British 
civil servants meant that significant entry barriers for the local population 
remained.
8 
The establishment of a ‘native’ bureaucracy, however, did not mean that 
Indianisation in content and interests happened. According to Zafarullah, et al. 
(1997),  
… Indianisation of the central civil service remained far from being fully 
achieved. The bureaucracy continued to be closed to the majority, élitist 
in education and training, and articulative of the interests of the English 
aristocracy. 
Because of the Imperial control over politics, the bureaucracy operated in 
a context of virtually complete domestic insularity. Countervailing institutions 
usually operational in an independent state such as a legislature, interest groups 
or local government—“existed only in an attenuated form”. [Kennedy (1987), p. 
4.] As a result, the bureaucracy did not face any political compulsions for 
accommodation of the public interest as such and was also insulated from 
domestic political pressures. 
 
The Immediate Post-Independence Period: 1947–58 
Regardless of its imperial character, by the time the British departed in 
1947, India and Pakistan inherited one of the most developed civil service 
systems in the world. The transition from personalised rule to a state and thence 
to a public and protected service was complete, at least in form if not in 
substance. Specifically in the case of Pakistan, political power in the initial years 
was fragile because of the very nature of the state carved out of British India.
9  
This logically meant that the non-elected arms of the state became dominant 
players. The institutional ascendancy of the bureaucracy—especially when 
compared with India—with regard to the rest of the state structure was further 
strengthened by the political leadership of the time. According to Sayeed (1980: 
                                                 
8Subsequent reforms, based on recommendations of the Islington Commission in 1917 and 
the Lee Commission in 1924, further facilitated the induction of the locals in the bureaucratic 
structure.  Kennedy (1987, p. 12) states that these recommendations had “only a marginal effect” on 
the structure of the bureaucracy. 
9The political party that led the demand for Pakistan had minimal representation in the 
western wing of the country. Moreover, as Jalal (1990) states, the non-elected arms of the state—the 
bureaucracy and the military—had their institutional structure intact after Partition whereas the 
elected arms suffered a major disruption.  
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26) soon after partition, a number of bureaucrats—many of them still 
Britishers—complained to the leadership about political interference from 
ministers. According to Sayeed (op. cit.): 
Jinnah could have drawn from this two conclusions: one, to place the 
politicians under bureaucratic tutelage; and two, to improve the [Muslim 
League] party machinery to eliminate some of the factions and 
accommodate others. He [Jinnah] was after all a dying man and could 
think of only immediate short term remedies. In settling for the first 
alternative, he not only took care of the immediate problems but laid the 
foundations for future actions and policies of his successor governments 
that outdid him in establishing bureaucratic control over politicians. 
Political instability in the 1947–58 decade further contributed to the 
ascendancy of the bureaucracy vis-à-vis the politicians. In terms of the 
criteria mentioned above, the bureaucratic structure was centralised, it was 
insulated, there was some level of internal accountability but political and/or 
judicial accountability was minimal. Lack of clear objectives about running 
of the state from the political leadership enabled the bureaucracy to 
determine its own agenda. Given its imperial training and ethos, its mode of 
administration remained colonial—at least so far as political representation 
was concerned. 
Although there was a developmental agenda that the bureaucracy 
appeared to pursue—that of industrialisation—the lack of a stable political 
base meant that whereas statebuilding task was accomplished a great deal, it 
was at the cost of nation-building. The military also increased its influence on 
policy-making during this period, particularly after Pakistan joined the 
CEATO and CENTO military alliances. Thus a number of commentators have 
characterised the state structure being dominated by a ‘bureaucratic-military 
oligarchy’. 
In terms of the bureaucratic structure, the most far reaching change 
brought about soon after partition in Pakistan was to abolish the provincial 
cadre. Thus emerged a centralised bureaucratic structure, which theoretically 
speaking may have been more efficient, but was also less accountable to 
politicians and thereby to the electorate. The centralisation of the bureaucracy 
was given further fillip by the centralisation of the political structure itself in the 
mid-1950s through the institution of the One Unit.
10  The upper echelons of the 
service remained virtually unchanged. The ICS was renamed the Civil Service 
                                                 
10The federal character of the state was altered to abolish provinces in West Pakistan to 
create ‘parity’ between the eastern and western wings of the country.  
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of Pakistan (CSP) and the functional character of the Pakistan Civil Service was 
also inherited without any alteration from the All India Civil Service.
11 
 
The Ayub and Yahya Periods: 1958–71 
The ‘bureaucratic-military oligarchy’ remained at the helm of the affairs 
for the entire decade of the 1960s. The military takeover of 1958 provided the 
bureaucracy enough space to take control of the policy-making process. The 
bureaucracy played an important role in crafting a restrictive political 
environment prevalent at the time.
12  There were three important avenues 
through which bureaucratic control was strengthened during this period. 
First, the bureaucracy was able to insulate itself from political 
interference by acquiring constitutional protection in the 1962 constitution. 
Moreover, the Basic Democracies system (hence BD) was structured to enhance 
bureaucrat powers at the local level over and above the politician [Cheema, et 
al. (2004)]. With a centralised bureaucratic structure in place, this allowed the 
bureaucracy to manipulate the political process at the local level. 
Second, the interventionist model of development pursued at the time 
mean the CSP cadre was at the centre policy formulation and execution process 
[Nadvi and Sayeed (2003)]. Individual bureaucrats were also in a position to 
enrich themselves through the large rents created in the manufacturing sector 
[see Nadvi and Sayeed (2003)]. This created a stake amongst the bureaucracy as 
an institution to continue with the economic policies pursued at the time, in spite 
of its deleterious impact on distribution of resources both across income groups 
and across regions. 
Third, as a consequence of the over-arching dominance of the CSP in the 
administrative system the issue of ethnic domination and interlocking ties 
amongst bureaucrats themselves and between the bureaucracy and the leading 
business groups came to the fore. Representation of Bengalis in the civil 
service—particularly the upper echelons—was miniscule, especially in 
comparison to their population share. On a more sinister note, by the late 1960s 
the bureaucracy was seen as having acquired tremendous social and economic 
power through interlocking relationships with other élite groups in society.   
Sayeed (1980, p. 73) describes the extent of such interlocking: 
In the years 1965-66, the secretary of foreign affairs, Pakistan’s 
ambassador in Washington and the secretaries of Home and Kashmir 
                                                 
11Functional categories inherited by the Central services were: foreign service, accounts, 
customs and excise, military lands and cantonments, information service, trade service and the 
central secretariat. 




Affairs and the Economic Affairs Division were related. Similarly, some 
of the senior civil servants were linked by family ties to members of the 
military hierarchy. And civil service, military and business hierarchies 
were becoming interrelated through new matrimonial ties. 
In terms of our model, the period of the 1960s shows that some important 
conditions outlined in Section 1 during this period. In a relative sense, the Ayub 
regime had a more clearly defined objective function. Economic development 
and repression of the political process were the principal objectives. The 
bureaucracy was centralised and the political process did not display any overt 
signs of clientelism [Sayeed (2002)]. With regard to monitoring and 
accountability of the bureaucracy, the results seem mixed. While the 
bureaucracy was paid well during this period, it is not clear whether bureaucratic 
malfeasance was being detected and sanctioned. However, the corporate ethos of 
the bureaucracy (especially the CSP) as well as the lack of evidence of pervasive 
corruption means that this condition was more or less met. The bureaucracy 
however was not accountable as such to higher level political leadership and in 
that sense its character of a colonial bureaucracy had not fundamentally altered.  
 
The Bhutto and Post-Bhutto Periods 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s 1973 Administrative reforms mark a major 
structural break in the institutional development of Pakistan’s civil bureaucracy. 
Key changes brought about by these reforms include: 
  •  The removal of constitutional protections, specified by the 1962 
Constitution, which granted protection to the civil bureaucracy in 
relation to remuneration, as well as for appeals against a disadvantaged 
alteration or interpretation of rules affecting the terms and conditions of 
service [World Bank (1998)]. Elaborate Constitutional safeguards 
provided for members of the CSP cadre pre-1973 reduced political 
control over this cadre and somewhat insulated the bureaucracy from 
political interference. The removal of these constitutional protections 
meant that bureaucratic protection was left to the terms and conditions of 
service defined by organic law and spelled out by the Civil Servants Act, 
1973 and the rules framed under it. 
  • “The CSP, the lineal descendent of the ICS cadre, was abolished” 
[Shafqat (1999)]. Instead, members of the CSP cadre were regrouped 
into the newly created District Management Group (DMG), Tribal 
Administration Group (TAG) and the Secretariat Group. 
  • The creation of the All Pakistan Unified Grade System ended the 
distinction between CSP, PSP and others. This meant that the  
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approximately 500 CSPs who had stood at the helm of the administrative 
machinery of over 500,000 members were amalgamated with other 
cadres into a hierarchical but mobile framework of 22 pay scales, and the 
separate provision for entry into an élite corps was terminated [Noman 
(1988)]. 
  • The long-standing practice of reserving posts in the top Federal and 
Provincial Secretariats for the CSP was discontinued.  
  • The creation of the Accounts group through the merger of the Pakistan 
Audits and Accounts (PAAS), Pakistan Military Accounts (PMAS), 
Pakistan Railway Accounts (PRAS). 
  • The well-knit hierarchy of the CSP cadre was broken by new provisions 
that allowed lateral entry and vertical and horizontal movements 
between cadres [Cheema (2003)].  Zia-ul-Haq used these provisions to 
institutionalise the induction of armed forces personnel in the civil 
service. This was done by instituting a 20 percent quota in the Civil 
Services for the Armed Forces—10 percent to be recruited from grade 
17 (i.e. Captain level) and the other 10 percent from Major level and 
above [Shafqat (1999)].
13 
These provision enhanced political control over the bureaucracy and 
curtailed the influence of the CSP cadre within the central bureaucracy. “In 1969 
CSPs held 93 percent of all posts of joint secretary level and above, however, by 
1973 CSPs accounted for only 43 percent of these posts and this number fell to 
36 percent by 1982” [Cheema (2003)]. Kennedy (1987) argues that the main 
beneficiaries of this opening up were members of the army and the Federal 
Unified Grades. These changes fragmented the internal cohesion of the 
bureaucracy and ensured that it no longer remained a tight-knit, insulated and 
exclusive body. 
Noman (1988) argues that these reforms not only ensured that the power 
of the élite CSP became circumscribed but the new recruitment to the 
bureaucracy became an instrument of political patronage for PPP supporters, 
which changed the nature of the bureaucracy. There appears to be some 
evidenced for this in that 17 percent of the lateral entrants recruited in 1973 had 
not been assigned posts as late as 1975. Furthermore, once General Zia assumed 
power he dismissed 40 percent of Bhutto’s lateral recruits on grounds of 
irregular appointments. These examples give a flavour of the importance 
political patronage had assumed in the running of the bureaucracy during the 
seventies. 
                                                 
13Shafqat (1999) argues that the military officers inducted from the Captain level were 




The opportunities to use bureaucratic employment as a patronage 
mechanism also increased during the Bhutto period because of the expansion in 
the size and purview of the state [Haque and Montiel (1992)].  Noman (1988) 
shows that as a result of these changes between 1973 and 1977, the 
Establishment Division accepted 1374 officers into the bureaucracy, 
approximately three times as many as would have been accepted through the 
CSP channels. 
Imperatives of political control over the bureaucracy during the 
seventies also fragmented the state structure in key functional areas. For 
example, political control imperatives vis-à-vis financial regulation were 
achieved by weakening State Bank of Pakistan’s (SBoP) regulatory and 
supervisory role through the creation of the Pakistan Banking Council 
(PBC), which became the operational controller of banks. The Federal 
government retained the right to select the members of PBC, and through the 
PBC it had effective control over the appointments to the boards of 
individual banks. More importantly, this change fragmented the state 
structure as the regulation and supervision of financial institutions and banks 
was shared by three agencies, the Ministry of Finance, PBC, and the SBP, 
each with overlapping jurisdictions with regard to some important functions. 
The fragmentation of the state structure was heightened with the 
proliferation of the number of ministers and ministries, which proliferated 
after the return of elected governments in 1985 [World Bank (1998)]. This 
resulted in conflicting interests and perverse incentives associated with a 
fragmented state structure. 
 
3.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE BHUTTO REFORMS 
 
Dysfunctionality and Inertia in Rules 
The reforms of 1973 interestingly did not alter the processes and 
procedures of bureaucratic conduct as they remained overly elaborate, non-
transparent, and discretionary [World Bank (1998)]. The discretionary nature of 
these rules heightened the principal-agent problem in the context of the 
fragmentation of the state structure. This is on account of two reasons. First, the 
declining internal cohesion and fragmentation of the bureaucracy allowed 
individual agents greater ‘autonomy’ to use discretionary powers even if they 
came at the expense of stated policy. Second, archaic performance measurement 
procedures, which employed little use of modern technology and lacked 
objective criteria of ‘outcome monitoring’, made it harder for principals to 
obtain ‘verifiable’ information on bureaucratic performance [World Bank, op. 
cit., Pakistan (2001)]. These two reasons combined to reduce the efficacy with  
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which politicians could hold individual bureaucrats accountable and this created 
room for individual or sectional rent-seeking within the bureaucracy. 
The inertia in rules and procedures can be gauged by analysing the 
effectiveness of key mechanisms of accountability within the bureaucracy. A 
key formal procedure for internal accountability is the Annual Confidential 
Report (ACR) system. Recent surveys of internal accountability mechanisms 
[Pakistan (2001)] show that the ACR continues to give greater emphasis to 
personal qualities than to setting objective and measurable targets against 
which performance is assessed. In fact, World Bank (1998) reports that the 
ACR is also never used to record adverse markings or comments. Similarly, 
the system of quarterly and annual reports although required by federal 
government rules of business is said to have become “no more than a ritual” 
[World Bank, op. cit.]. 
 
Changes in the Political Structure 
There were two important breaks in the 1970s with regard to the 
development of the political structure that had an important impact on the 
‘developmental efficacy’ of the bureaucracy. First, is the electoral success of 
mass based ‘populist’ parties in Pakistan in the 1970 elections. This 
development affected the structure of the bureaucracy in two ways. First, 
populism resulted in the bureaucracy becoming an employment agency through 
which patronage was dispensed to party-based cadres [Noman (1988)]. Second, 
Bhutto’s populism resulted in expanding the role of the state quite rapidly, as a 
result of which the total expenditure to GDP ratio increased from 6.6 percent in 
1969-70 to 14 percent in 1979-80 [Pasha and Fatima (1999)]. As mentioned 
above both these effects resulted in the politicisation of the bureaucracy and 
reduced its internal cohesiveness and insularity. 
The second development was the fragmentation of the political structures that 
was a result of Zia’s interventions in the political and electoral spheres that aimed to 
neutralise the presence of organised political parties within the political structure. 
This was achieved through the establishment of Martial Law that dissolved the 
elected provincial and federal tiers in 1977 and through the promulgation of the 
Local Government Ordinances in 1979, which ensured that representation became 
confined to the local level [Cheema and Mohmand (2003)]. The representative 
principle was further weakened at the local level because of interventions against 
political parties.
14 According to Cheema and Mohmand (2003): 
This was done through: the disqualification of a large number of 
candidates with a PPP affiliation in the 1979 local bodies’ elections and 
                                                 
14According to:  Cheema,  et al. (2004), Cheema and Mohmand (2003).  
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by holding local elections on a non-party basis. Although non-party 
elections had been the norm at the local level since independence, 
nonetheless during this period, they represented an important reversal 
because mass-based political parties had emerged as important players in 
the electoral arena since the 1970 federal and provincial elections. These 
political interventions represented a continuation of the centre’s control 
over local elections and political space (with adverse consequences for 
electoral competition at the local level). 
The effect of the above developments was the capture of the local level 
by politically mobilised localised clientelist elements now gained at the expense 
of organised political parties. Zia’s decision to exclude political parties from the 
federal and provincial elections of 1985, which were held on a non-party basis, 
helped to elevate these local clientelist elements to the higher tiers of the state 
and these networks ended up capturing significant electoral and political space 
at the provincial and federal levels. As a result, the 1985 higher tier assemblies 
emerged as politically fragmented patronage structures.
15 As Wilder (1999) 
states: “This tendency towards the localisation and personalisation of politics 
was not muted after the revival of party-based Federal and Provincial 
Assemblies in 1988 because party organisations had been considerably 
weakened by measures taken against them during the Zia period”.
16  The space 
created by this weakening of parties was filled by the formation of mobile and 
fluid local political factions
17 that “linked up with higher political factions and 
ultimately with parties at the provincial and national levels” [Gazdar (2002)]. 
Personalisation of politics, weakening of party organisations, and the fluidity 
and mobility of local vote blocs successfully fragmented the political structure 
[Cheema and Mohmand (2003)]. The emergence of decentralised clientelist 
political collectivities coupled with the repeated use of the President’s powers, 
given by the 8th Constitutional Amendment, to dissolve assemblies shortened 
                                                 
15As one minister put it during the 1985 National Assembly’s first budget session, “We 
don’t have one party, or ten parties......we have two hundred parties. Each member of the assembly 
considers himself responsible only to himself” [Haq (1985)]. 
16The weakening of political parties is exemplified by the manner in which parties allocate 
electoral tickets and ministries. “The allocation of these key political benefits is more an outcome of 
individual bargaining between powerful local brokers and party leaders rather than being based on 
collective decision-making within the political party organisations. This is borne out by the extensive 
switching of candidates between political parties that has taken place since 1985”[Cheema, et al. 
(2004)]. 
17Wilder (1999) provides evidence of heightened electoral competition in Punjab between 
the major political parties in national and provincial elections since the mid-1980s, which indicates 
the extent of mobility of the local political factions.  
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the time horizons of Pakistan’s political leadership and individual politicians, 
which further entrenched clientelist policy objectives at the expense of 
developmental goals [World Bank (2002); Keefer, et al. (2003)]. 
 
The Effect of Broader Socio-economic Changes  
    on Bureaucratic Conduct 
Another important factor that has eroded the internal cohesion of the 
bureaucracy is the changing social profile of the bureaucrats. An important 
mechanism of internal cohesion within the CSP cadre was that a large number of 
CSPs belonged to either the landed élite or urban professional groups, received 
education at the same schools and colleges and generally had a shared socio-
economic background. For example, Ahmed (1964) and Braibanti (1966) 
classified approximately 70 percent of those who joined the civil service as 
belonging to the middle class and another 25 percent as belonging to upper 
landed classes. An important consequence of urbanisation, the spread of 
education and the growth of political populism during the late sixties and 
seventies was that this socio-economic profile underwent significant change. 
Shafqat’s (1999) analysis of socio-economic backgrounds of those who joined 
civil service during 1987-97 suggests that there has been a major change in the 
profiles of civil servants. His survey shows that 88 percent of those joining 
service belonged to the middle class, while only 4 percent to upper landed 
families. Furthermore, he shows that education has played an important role in 
access to civil service. This is supported by the evidence that the educational 
qualification of the average entrant to the civil service has increased. During 
1950-60 only 60 percent of new entrants had an MA/MSc, whereas during the 
period 1987-97 over 75 percent had an MA/MSc. These changes has eroded the 
class and group basis of internal cohesion as entrants to the civil service are 
likely to come from diverse backgrounds and schooling systems, which reduces 
the cohesion of the bureaucracy and makes it more fragmented. 
The ‘developmental efficacy’ of the Pakistani bureaucracy has also been 
adversely affected by the erosion of the economic and financial incentives of 
bureaucrats. Recent evidence [World Bank (1998); Pakistan (2001)] shows that 
an important disincentive in the current bureaucratic structure is the low salary 
structure. Pakistan (2001) finds that the present compensation packages for all 
employees are extremely low. The inadequacy of the current pay structure can 
be assessed by benchmarking the pay package for civil servants against pay 
packages received by private sector agents with the same experience profile. 
World Bank (1998) makes such a comparison at the level of Senior Federal 
Secretary, with the comparison category being the Managing Director (MD) of a 
domestic corporation. They find that after monetising all the benefits and  
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adjusting for job security, the pay package of a senior federal secretary is half of 
what is earned by an MD in a domestic corporation. Pakistan (2001) reaffirms 
this finding and in addition points out that the “problem of low wages is further 
exacerbated by limited availability of official accommodation and other 
facilities. Many officers end up paying almost their entire salary for house rent”. 
The low salary structure, in turn, leads to low morale, poor performance and sets 
incentives for heightened corruption. There could also be second-order effects of 
low pays, which have not been empirically measured for Pakistan, such as, non-
corrupt individuals opting out of the civil service because of the dysfunctionality 
of the salary structure.
18 
 
Changes in the Bureaucratic Structure and Its Impact 
Institutional reforms instituted by Bhutto, socio-economic changes, 
and the changing nature of the political structure have had a number of 
adverse consequences for the ‘developmental efficacy’ of Pakistan’s 
bureaucracy. First, the fragmentation of the political structure and the 
entrenchment of clientelist coalitions has created a disjuncture between the 
existing objectives of Pakistan’s state managers and the broader 
requirements of developmental policy that focuses at a minimum on the 
efficient provision of public and merit goods [Keefer, et al. (2003)]. During 
the eighties this has resulted in the civil service being used as a patronage 
mechanism for the employment of clients of various political groups, with 
the late eighties to mid-nineties witnessing a very fast growth in the size of 
the provincial civil service [World Bank (1998)]. More importantly, the use 
of the civil service as an employment bureau has created a dysfunctional mix 
of personnel within the civil service, with approximately 71 percent of the 
civil service personnel being concentrated in the BPS 1-7 category 
(accountants, clerical staff). Against this, the proportion of the officer cadre 
BPS 16–22 is extremely small at 9.8 percent [World Bank (1998)]. 
More importantly, the declining insularity of the civil service and the 
fragmentation of the political structure have led to the politicisation of the 
bureaucracy. World Bank (1998) finds that examples of politicisation include: 
excessively frequent contact of politicians with the local staff by undermining 
the hierarchical structures of decision-making; the development of patron/client 
relationships under which public servants owe their loyalty to particular 
politicians rather than to their hierarchy in the public service; and the induction 
of unqualified mid-career appointments through the use of the lateral entry 
system. This tendency has assumed a new dimension since the military coup of 
                                                 
18 We further discuss this issue in Section 4.  
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1999. A much larger contingent of retired and serving military personnel have 
been inducted in the bureaucracy during this period than at any other time in the 
past. Between October 1999 and September 2003, a total of 1027 military 
personnel were employed in the civil service and semi-autonomous state 
corporations. Of these 276 were appointed in senior positions (Grades 20-22).
19 
This ‘militarisation’ of the bureaucracy has not only further intensified the issue 
the fragmentation of the bureaucracy but has also significantly affected the 
criterion of merit-based recruitment. 
The authority of the bureaucracy has also been weakened through the use 
of provisions allowing horizontal and vertical movement of bureaucrats across 
cadres. This became an important mechanism for shedding bureaucrats who 
refused to play ball and was used by all political managers of the state since the 
1970s. The most important adverse consequence of politicisation has been that 
the stability in the framework of rules and regulations has been undermined. For 
example, most decisions related to tax policy are taken by bureaucrats through 
SROs by passing parliament [Pakistan (2001)]. In many departments there is a 
tendency to change the rules for eligibility of promotion a few months before the 
meeting of the promotion board in order to favour political clients [World Bank 
(1998)]. The power to relax rules has been widely used to legitimise 
decentralised patronage by individual members of the executive and these 
powers in many cases do not require the prior approval of even the Cabinet 
[World Bank (1998)]. The politicisation of the bureaucracy has resulted in 
eroding the rule-based nature of the Pakistani bureaucracy, which has lowered 
the cost of bureaucrats being captured by clientelist politicians, increased the 
probability of collusion between bureaucrats and fragmented clientelist networks 
and has undermined formal mechanisms of merit based recruitment and 
accountability.  
The combination of a fragmented clientelist polity and a fragmented 
state structure has shortened the time horizons of state officials. The ability 
of officials to retain key posts has come to be based on political influence 
and not on an objective set of institutional rules. Similarly, appointments and 
promotions are no longer based on well specified ‘rules’ but on the ability of 
individual officials to sustain political protection. It is, therefore, rational for 
officials to accommodate ‘clientelist patrons’ offering the highest short-term 
payoffs, even if this means undermining ‘rules’, policy objectives and social 
welfare. 
                                                 
19This information is excerpted from information provided to the Senate of Pakistan by the 
Establishment Division, reported in “1,027 army officers working on civilian posts”, Daily Dawn,  
September 27, 2003.  
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4.  AN APPRAISAL OF RECENT EFFORTS AT BUREAUCRATIC 
REFORM: THE MUSHARRAF REGIME AND AFTER 
Since the military coup of 1999, bureaucratic reform has come on the 
agenda more explicitly. A number of committees were formed within the 
government for this purpose. Other governmental initiatives, specifically the 
Devolution Plan, also had far reaching implications on bureaucratic structure. 
Conceptually, these reforms can be categorised as addressing three elements 
given below. 
 
(i) Reforms to Enhance Bureaucratic Monitoring and Accountability 
The Musharraf regime’s Devolution of Power Plan (2000) operationalised 
through local government ordinances (2001) in all four provinces is a far 
reaching reform that  has the explicit objective of enhancing bureaucratic 
accountability at the district level.
20  First, as a result of this plan provincial line 
departments that were only indirectly accountable to the provincial political tier 
have been placed under the authority of elected nazims at the district level. As 
Cheema and Mohmand (2003) show that “this has significantly empowered the 
local-level elected tier, at least on paper, and created a new form of 
accountability for the provincial line departments”. Second, the concentration of 
power in the hands of the old Deputy Commissioner (DC) has been diluted by 
stripping the new District Coordination Officer’s (DCO) office of the executive 
magistracy, revenue and law and order functions. The new DCO’s office on 
paper “only retains the administrative and coordination functions associated 
with the old DCs office” [Cheema and Mohmand (2003)]. Furthermore, the 
DCO—the head of the district under the current system—reports directly to the 
elected nazim rather than to the provincial secretaries. Bureaucratic 
accountability is expected to increase in the current system for two reasons. 
First, local level bureaucrats report directly to local level elected politicians, 
which is expected to reduce monitoring and information costs. Second, electoral 
accountability is expected to increase at the district level because the new 
system has brought government closer to the people in “an electoral sense with 
the population per elected representative being much smaller at the district and 
union level than at the level of the higher tiers of the state” [Cheema and 
Mohmand (2003)]. 
In short, devolution is expected to increase politicians’ accountability vis-
à-vis the electorate, which, in turn, is expected to increase local politicians’ 
incentives to both adhere to developmental objectives and to monitor 
                                                 




bureaucratic performance. Equally importantly by lowering the politicians’ costs 
of monitoring the provincial bureaucracy devolution is expected to increase the 
ability of politicians to hold the provincial bureaucracy accountable. 
However, a number of social, political and systemic impediments, 
discussed below, continue to mute the politicians’ ability to hold the 
bureaucracy accountable. Furthermore, these impediments also appear to mute 
district politicians’ electoral accountability, which, in turn, reduces their 
incentives to both adhere to development objectives and to hold the bureaucrats 
accountable if they diverge from these goals.  
First, it appears that the military’s choice of holding non-party and 
indirect elections at the local level [for details and reasons see Cheema and 
Mohmand (2003)] appears to have reproduced old clientelist hierarchies within 
the district polity. For example, Manning, et al. (2003) find that 30 percent of 
district nazims in the Punjab were former MNAs or MPAs, and approximately 
90 percent belonged to established political families. This suggests that the a 
priori  expectation that politicians’ electoral accountability will be enhanced 
because of devolution is by no means self-evident. In turn, this implies that old 
clientelist objectives may continue to dominate politics in many districts, which 
will only reinforce the reproduction of many of the old anti-poor distortions in 
public service delivery. 
Second,
21 it appears that the local level politicians’ ability to hold the 
provincial bureaucrat accountable is muted by the provincial secretariats 
retention of important  powers that constrain the autonomous functioning of the 
district government vis-à-vis the provincial line bureaucracy. For example, 
under the current system most “DCOs and EDOs continue to be a part of the 
federal and provincial cadres and all decisions regarding promotions and 
transfers are taken by their provincial secretariats”. The retention of these 
powers by the provincial bureaucracy appears to be creating significant 
obstacles for district politicians in their attempt to hold the provincial 
bureaucracy accountable. Furthermore, retention of personnel functions by the 
provincial secretariats, in addition to muting the district nazims ability to 
sanction individual bureaucrats, mutes their de jure power to determine the 
employment level of bureaucrats at the aggregate budgetary level. 
Lastly, in spite of devolution the rules, procedures and mechanisms of 
bureaucratic accountability continue from the past. For example, the key formal 
procedure of internal accountability remains the ACR (with all its contingent 
problems discussed earlier) and the current system remains devoid of 
mechanisms to measure output based bureaucratic performance. This suggests 
                                                 
21This point draws heavily on Cheema and Mohmand (2003).  
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that it is unclear whether the costs of obtaining verifiable information on 
bureaucratic performance has been lowered for politicians. 
 
(ii) Reforms to Enhance Incentive Compatibility 
In order to enhance incentive compatibility The Pay Award Committee
22 
and the TAFTA (2001) have both recommended a pay and pension increase, 
with fully monetised salary packages for bureaucrats. The idea is that higher 
salaries will increase incentives for bureaucrats to put in effort. TAFTA (2001) 
clearly suggests that “focusing attention on people (transparent and competitive 
recruitment, training, salaries, accountability)...is a step in the right direction for 
eliminating the menace of corruption in any organisation in general, and tax 
administration, in particular” (emphasis added). It further goes on to emphasise 
that the current “compensation system ...does not provide a living wage for most 
employees”. 
As pointed out in Section 1, pay reforms offer positive effort incentives in 
so far as: (a) politicians have an interest in aligning bureaucrats’ incentives to 
coherent goals; (b) politicians have the ability to monitor bureaucrats efficiently; 
and (c) politicians have the ability to sanction ill-performing bureaucrats. We 
have shown earlier that there is no a priori expectation in the current system that 
these conditions will be met given both the structure of politics and the design of 
administrative rules. Furthermore, no reforms have been undertaken that aim to 
deliver measurable improvements in the probability of detecting bureaucratic 
free-riding. In particular, without a reform of the terms and conditions of civil 
service employment ‘rules’ and internal disciplinary procedures, which continue 
to persist from the old system, there is no likelihood that the cost to politicians 
of monitoring, sanctioning or even dismissing corrupt or shirking bureaucrats is 
likely to fall. Unless these systems are changed, pay increases alone are unlikely 
to improve effort and reduce corruption substantively.
23 
 
(iii) ‘Right-sizing’: Reforms to Improve the Bureaucratic Structure 
Another area of reform that has been floated is that of right-sizing of the 
bureaucracy so that problems of over-staffing (and the consequent practice of 
using the government as an employment exchange) and the lopsided structure of 
                                                 
22Discussed in Khan (2001, p. 23). 
23In many cases, bureaucratic powers are so large and the resultant rents to be accrued from 
the exercise of these powers are so high that fiscally feasible pay increases will not reduce the 
opportunity cost to indulge in rent-seeking. Some compatibility with salaries and perks in the private 
sector, however, is desirable if competent and professional individuals are to be attracted towards the 
new civil service.  
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the bureaucracy (which is regarded as too bottom heavy) is corrected. The 
Report of the Committee on Restructuring and Right-sizing of the Federal 
Ministries and Divisions [henceforth Pakistan (2001)] is the newest and most 
comprehensive document which sets out the parameters for this particular 
reform effort. 
The Report is based on asking 30 of the 34 federal government divisions 
to formulate their own mission statements on the basis of which they were asked 
to recommend right-sizing and restructuring in their respective ministries. It is 
not clear what the status of implementation of this Report has been to date. 
Nonetheless, there are a number of conceptual problems with it. First, the report 
deals only with the Federal Government whereas seventy percent of the 
employment is generated by the provincial governments, with critical service 
delivery functions at that level and below. Without an adequate plan or proposal 
for restructuring/right-sizing at that level, any exercise for right-sizing will be 
incomplete.
24 
Second, without the Federal government itself explicitly defining its own 
objectives, the exercise of seeking a mission statement from individual 
ministries is violative of criterion (a) of the model in Section 1.
25 Some 
conception of the overall structure with respect to the three tiers of the 
government is also required if “staffing changes are to be focused at the 
appropriate locations”. [Khan (2001), p. 20]. 
Third, Pakistan (2001) has emphasised on down-sizing of lower level staff 
to correct the lopsidedness in the structure of the bureaucracy. The report 
recommends cutting down approximately 40,000 out of 135,000 posts in grades 
16 and below. This may be a necessary condition to improve the balance of the 
civil service as well as send the signal that the bureaucracy is not an employment 
exchange. However, it is not a sufficient condition. For improvements in 
governance and service delivery, it is equally important that capacity constraints, 
in terms of requisite skills and training, in the upper echelons of the bureaucracy 
(Grades 21-22) are also addressed.
26 This may entail that sufficient pruning of 
higher level bureaucracy is also undertaken. Fourth, the procedure for right-sizing 
adopted in practice over the last decade and endorsed by Pakistan (2001) 
concentrates on voluntary golden handshakes. This has created adverse selection 
problems as those who are more competent and can command a high premium for 
                                                 
24To our knowledge, no such coordinated effort has been undertaken as yet. 
25This is important as the efficacy of the particular ministry or division itself has to be 
explicated by the executive branch of the government. For instance, if a particular ministry is 
altogether not needed then the present exercise is redundant, at least for that ministry/division. 
26Several senior bureaucrats interviewed on this issue stated that there are no more than 40-
50 individuals of requisite capacity and “even their skills and training were often inadequate for the 
tasks they needed to perform”. [Khan (2001), p. 20.].  
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their skills in the private sector tend to opt for the golden handshake. The less 
competent ones continue with the security of a government job. 
Last, but not the least, is the issue of political resistance to right/down-
sizing.  For the last decade, successive governments have been aware of the 
uneven structure of the bureaucracy and the consequent need for reducing its 
strength, particularly at the lower echelons. However, evidence suggests that not 
much has been accomplished so far. Constraints in down-sizing for political 
governments is understandable, especially in a country with a long tradition of 
preference for state employment.
27 But the fact that the military government 
itself did not even demonstrate the requisite intent of down-sizing the provincial 
governments goes to show that even a praetorian government was not immune 
to the risk of the political backlash—in this case on its legitimacy rather than the 
electoral calculus that afflicts politicians—that it may have encountered. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has attempted to contextualise the decline in bureaucratic 
conduct within the broader parameters of the historical legacy of colonial 
inheritance as well as socio-political changes that have occurred, especially in 
the last three decades. While the bureaucracy was a coherent institution in the 
pre-1970 period, its élitist character and its lack of accountability meant that its 
remit was far beyond its core function—i.e. that of an intermediary between 
politicians and the electorate. 
Bhutto’s reforms broke the steel frame of the bureaucracy. The structural 
changes brought about in the laws governing the civil service as well as changes 
in the society and polity continue to prevail in today’s Pakistan. Some of the key 
changes in this respect need to be reiterated: 
  •  Declining Insulation of the Bureaucracy. The declining internal 
cohesion of Pakistan’s bureaucracy, an outcome of the breakdown of 
informal social, class and educational networks that had controlled the 
bureaucracy prior to the seventies reforms, eroded the insulation of 
Pakistan’s bureaucratic structure.  
  • Fragmentation of the Bureaucracy. The imperative of political control 
set incentives for the creation of fragmented agencies with overlapping 
jurisdictions and that this process took root after the 1973 reforms.  
  •  Distortions Created by Dysfunctional and Inert Rules. The persistence of 
dysfunctional rules made it difficult for principals to obtain ‘verifiable’ 
information on bureaucratic performance and this heightened the 
principal-agent problem within the Pakistani bureaucracy. 
                                                 
27Wilder (1999) demonstrates that the state sector employment is a priority demand from the 
electorate at the time of elections.  
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  • Erosion of Salaries. While there has been an increase in the size of the 
state since the seventies this has been matched by erosion in the real 
salary benefits for both higher and lower level bureaucrats. 
  •  Rise of Politically Fragmented Clientelism.  Finally, the Zia period 
resulted in the proliferation and entrenchment of fragmented clientelist 
networks that came to dominate both political parties and the wider 
political process. 
The consequences of the 1973 reforms for bureaucratic development can 
be analysed through the lens of the logical model given in Section 1.  It is clear 
that since the 1970s, condition (c) of the model that requires efficient 
bureaucratic monitoring and accountability has not been met. First, declining 
salaries in real terms ensured that bureaucratic incentives were no longer 
‘incentive compatible’. Second, dysfunctional and inert ‘rules’ raised the cost of 
acquiring ‘verifiable’ information regarding bureaucratic performance and 
outcomes. In turn, opaqueness of information combined with an inefficient 
judicial system raised the cost of sanctioning ill performing bureaucrats. This 
process was reinforced by collusive arrangements between powerful political 
patrons and bureaucrats. 
The rising dominance of political clientelism combined with new ‘rules’ 
defined by Bhutto’s reforms reduced the degree of insulation of the 
bureaucracy, which violated condition (d) of the logical model. Finally, the 
efficacy of the political process in establishing operational objectives 
consistent with a coherent agenda had declined because of the proliferation of 
clientelism, which resulted in powerful individual ‘political patrons’ following 
goals that created redistributive benefits for clients, such as granting state 
employment, rather than pursuing developmental public goods [Keefer, et al. 
(2003)]. This meant that condition (b) of the model was also being violated. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the efficacy of Pakistan’s bureaucratic 
structure has been declining since the seventies given that these three essential 
conditions for the efficient functioning of the bureaucratic structure were not 
being met due to changes in ‘rules’ brought about by Bhutto’s reforms and due 
to changes in Pakistan’s political structure. All these factors have meant that 
as the structure and conduct of bureaucracy stands now, rather than being an 
agent for change, the bureaucracy can be reasonably categorised as an 
impediment to pro-poor change.  
There are important lessons to be learnt from the Pakistan’s chequered 
political history. An over-powering bureaucracy with no accountability—as 
in the pre-1970 period—is incompatible with the existent level of political 
mobilisation that prevails in the country.  It is also not desirable to the extent 
that its complete disregard of and animosity for representative politics means  
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that its conduct will always lack ownership and legitimacy. The Bhutto 
reforms had the effect of throwing the baby out with the bath water. A rules-
based bureaucracy with a certain degree of security of tenure is thus 
required, but one which is appropriately accountable for its conduct to a 
sovereign parliament and an impartial judiciary. Although the élitism of the 
past is no longer possible, it is important that a well-knit structure is created 
for the bureaucracy to insulate it from political clientelism that it is 
confronted with presently. 
It is important to recall that in the larger scheme of things—specifically 
for pro-poor change—the bureaucracy is only a transmission chain. Even if 
efforts in creating a competent and rules-based efficient bureaucracy are 
successful (either through design or a magic wand) but the objectives and goals 
of the state remain anti-poor, it can still create an inferior outcome so far as pro-
poor change is concerned as an efficient anti-poor bureaucracy will execute such 
policies more efficiently. Thus any form of bureaucratic reform will have to be a 
part of a pro-poor political and economic reform in Pakistan. 
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